The Silent Role of Corporate Theory in the Supreme Court\u27s Campaign Finance Cases by Padfield, Stefan J.
  
831 
THE SILENT ROLE OF CORPORATE THEORY IN THE SUPREME 
COURT’S CAMPAIGN FINANCE CASES 
Stefan J. Padfield! 
ABSTRACT 
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, a 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court 
held that corporate political speech could not be regulated on the basis of corporate status alone.  In 
support of that conclusion, the majority characterized corporations as mere “associations of 
citizens.”  The dissent, meanwhile, viewed corporations as state-created entities that “differ from 
natural persons in fundamental ways” and “have been ‘effectively delegated responsibility for 
ensuring society’s economic welfare.’”  I have previously argued that these two competing 
conceptions of the corporation implicate corporate theory, with the majority adopting an 
aggregate/contractarian view, and the dissent an artificial entity/concession view.  Even if one 
understands Citizens United to be primarily about listeners’ rights, this stark contrast of 
competing theories of the corporation is difficult to ignore.  At the very least, what the majority and 
dissent thought about corporate speakers was relevant to deciding whether the campaign finance 
restrictions challenged in Citizens United should fall within that narrow class of speech 
restrictions justified on the basis of the speaker’s identity due to “an interest in allowing 
governmental entities to perform their functions.”  Somewhat surprisingly, however, the majority 
was silent, and the dissent expressly disavowed, any role for corporate theory.  I have also 
previously offered some explanations for this apparent inconsistency, and concluded that an active 
“silent corporate theory debate” was indeed integral to the outcome of Citizens United—despite 
protestations to the contrary.  In this Article, I examine the key Supreme Court cases leading up to 
Citizens United to see whether a similar silent corporate theory debate is evident in those cases.  I 
find that there is indeed such an on-going debate, and proceed to argue that in future cases 
involving the rights of corporations, the Justices should make their views regarding the proper 
theory of the corporation express.  This will allow for a more meaningful discussion of the merits of 
those decisions, and impose an additional layer of intellectual accountability on the jurists.       
 
 
 ! Associate Professor, University of Akron School of Law.  B.A., Brown University; J.D., 
University of Kansas.  This Article was presented at the Midwest Corporate Law Scholars 
Conference on June 15, 2011; a faculty workshop at the University of Dayton School of 
Law on October 11, 2011; the Central States Law Schools Association Scholarship 
Conference on October 29, 2011; a faculty workshop at the University of Akron School of 
Law on February 22, 2012; and the Law and Society Association Annual Meeting on June 
8, 2012.  My thanks to all the participants for their helpful comments.  Particular thanks 
also to Stephen Bainbridge for his comments on the relationship between the director-
primacy and real-entity theories of the corporation. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, a 5-4 majority of the 
Supreme Court ruled that corporate political speech could not be regulated 
on the basis of corporate status alone.1  Given that there is a great deal of 
debate about what corporations are (corporations have to date eluded 
capture), one would think that the Court would have needed to answer that 
question first before reaching its conclusion.  However, the majority was 
silent on this issue and the dissent went so far as to expressly disavow any 
role for corporate theory at all.2  Instead, the opinion appeared to rest on a 
“listeners’ rights” analysis.3  It remains unclear, however, how focusing on 
 
 1 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (“[T]he Government may not suppress political speech on the 
basis of the speaker’s corporate identity.”). 
 2 Id. at 971 n.72 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (“Nothing in this 
analysis turns on whether the corporation is conceptualized as a grantee of a state 
concession, . . . a nexus of explicit and implicit contracts, . . . a mediated hierarchy of 
stakeholders, . . . or any other recognized model.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 3 See Larry E. Ribstein, The First Amendment and Corporate Governance, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 
1019, 1052–53 (2011) (discussing implications of a listeners’ rights rationale of Citizens 
United).  But see First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 828 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (“It is true . . . that recent decisions of this Court have emphasized the interest 
of the public in receiving the information offered by the speaker seeking protection.  The 
free flow of information is in no way diminished by the Commonwealth’s decision to 
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listeners’ rights could eliminate all need to examine the nature of 
corporations.4  For example, how would one know whether corporations fit 
within the well-established line of identity-based exception cases under the 
First Amendment without addressing the unique aspects of corporate 
identity?5  As I have previously noted: 
[The fact that] corporations could pursue goals that no individual living 
human being desired (and that might in fact be harmful to human 
beings) because the relevant decision-makers were legally required to 
follow the dictates of a fictional shareholder, could implicate the 
question of whether corporations should fall within that narrow class of 
speech restrictions justified on the basis of identity due to “an interest in 
allowing governmental entities to perform their functions.”6 
The Court in Citizens United simply rejected any such contention by baldly 
asserting that:  “The corporate independent expenditures at issue in this 
case, however, would not interfere with governmental functions.”7 
Despite protestations to the contrary, however, a closer reading of the 
Citizens United opinion reveals that both the majority and dissent not only 
adopted diverging theories of the corporation, but that those theories were 
likely dispositive.  I have previously set forth my arguments in support of this 
 
permit the operation of business corporations with limited rights of political expression.  
All natural persons, who owe their existence to a higher sovereign than the 
Commonwealth, remain as free as before to engage in political activity.”).  Cf. TAMARA R. 
PIETY, BRANDISHING THE FIRST AMENDMENT:  COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 18 
(2012) (noting that Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (creating the commercial speech doctrine), “was also novel 
because it focused on the listeners’ (consumers’) rights to hear rather than on the 
speakers’ (pharmacies’) right to speak”). 
 4 Cf. Anne Tucker, Flawed Assumptions:  A Corporate Law Analysis of Free Speech and Corporate 
Personhood in Citizens United, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 497, 511 (2011) (“The [Massachu-
setts Citizens For Life] Court, however, used the marketplace-of-ideas metaphor as a general 
justification to restrict corporate speech, not as a means to strike down the regulation for 
the benefit of the citizen-listeners as it had in past cases.” (citing Fed. Election Comm’n v. 
Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986) (“This concern over the corrosive 
influence of concentrated corporate wealth reflects the conviction that it is important to 
protect the integrity of the marketplace of political ideas.”))). 
 5 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899 (“The Court has upheld a narrow class of speech 
restrictions that operate to the disadvantage of certain persons . . . .”). 
 6 Stefan J. Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation:  More Than a Nexus-Of-Contracts, 114 W. VA. 
L. REV. 209, 227–28 (2011) (footnote omitted) (quoting Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899) 
[hereinafter Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation].  See also Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 972 
(Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (“Perhaps the officers or directors 
of the corporation have the best claim to be the ones speaking, except their fiduciary 
duties generally prohibit them from using corporate funds for personal ends. . . . It is 
entirely possible that the corporation’s electoral message will conflict with their personal 
convictions.”); Tucker, supra note 4, at 536 (“A second, broader criticism of the Court’s 
assumptions regarding the singular corporate voice and freedom of association is that 
corporate speech does not reflect the view of any citizen-shareholder . . . .”). 
 7 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899. 
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proposition elsewhere, and will repeat them here to the extent necessary in 
Part III.A.8  Obviously, understanding the Court to have based its decision 
on a “covert” application of corporate theory raises a number of interesting 
questions.  First, why not simply engage in this analysis overtly?  Second, if 
the Court engaged in a silent corporate theory analysis in Citizens United, was 
that the first time it had done so or is this part of some larger trend?  Finally, 
how should we respond to this practice, if in fact it is one?  I will attempt to 
answer these questions in this Article. 
Following this Introduction, I will set forth a brief overview of the 
relevant theories of the corporation.  In Part III, I will examine the role of 
corporate theory in some of the Supreme Court’s most important campaign 
finance cases.  First, in Part III.A, I will explain how corporate theory was 
dispositive in Citizens United.  Next, in Part III.B, I will examine the key 
Supreme Court cases leading up to Citizens United.  I will argue that 
corporate theory played the same silent and dispositive role in many of those 
cases as it did in Citizens United. 
In Part IV, I will discuss the implications of my conclusions.  Ultimately, I 
will argue that the Justices of the Supreme Court should make express their 
views about what constitutes the best theory of the corporation.  This will 
allow for better analysis and criticism of the Court’s opinions in this area.  
While there remains some possibility that this practice would not alter the 
ultimate results in at least some of these cases, it is difficult to argue that the 
increased transparency and accountability would be a bad thing.  
Furthermore, as I will strive to make clear in the pages that follow, as 
between the two primary theories of the corporation, one essentially 
precludes the possibility of reaching Citizens United’s conclusion that political 
speech rights may not be regulated on the basis of corporate status alone, 
and the other is practically necessary to reach that result.  In light of this, the 
Court’s failure to discuss corporate theory in Citizens United (beyond Justice 
Stevens’ unconvincing attempt to sweep the issue aside in a footnote) 
constitutes a material omission that should be corrected in future opinions 
 
 8 This Article extends my previous work on Citizens United and the theory of the 
corporation.  See Stefan J. Padfield, Citizens United and the Nexus-of-Contracts Presumption, 1 
HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 25, 26 (2011), http://www.hblr.org/2011/01/citizens-united-
and-the-nexus-of-contracts-presumption/ [hereinafter Padfield, Citizens United and the 
Nexus-of-Contracts Presumption] (arguing that the competing visions of the corporation 
advanced by the majority and dissent in Citizens United roughly aligned with two divergent 
theories of the corporation—“nexus-of-contracts theory for the majority and concession 
theory for the dissent”); Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation, supra note 6 (arguing that 
Dodd-Frank’s official recognition of the too-big-to-fail corporation undermined the 
majority’s opinion in Citizens United because that opinion rested on a theory of the 
corporation that espouses a worldview wherein deregulated markets lead to an efficient 
allocation of assets, not global crisis). 
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addressing the role of corporations in society.  Nonetheless, I do address 
some potential criticisms of my proposal in Part V.  Finally, I provide 
concluding remarks in Part VI. 
II.  A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE THEORIES OF THE CORPORATION 
Robert Hamilton and Richard Booth identify the primary theories of the 
corporation as:  (1) entity theory; (2) concession theory; (3) contract theory; 
(4) nexus-of-contracts theory (also known as contractarianism); and, 
(5) “process” theory.9  As I will explain in more detail below, Hamilton’s and 
Booth’s process theory can be understood to capture both the director-
primacy and team-production theories of the corporation.10  One should 
also understand that concession theory and “artificial entity” theory are 
essentially synonymous, as are nexus-of-contracts theory and “aggregate” 
theory.  Finally, I will also argue that director-primacy/team-production 
theory and “real entity” theory are synonymous.11  Because this may all be a 
bit overwhelming for the uninitiated, I offer the following table for 
assistance.  The reader should take comfort in knowing that at the end of 
this section we will predominantly be focusing on only two of these theories:  
concession and nexus-of-contracts. 
 
 9 ROBERT W. HAMILTON & RICHARD A. BOOTH, BLACK LETTER OUTLINES:  CORPORATIONS 
327–32 (5th ed. 2006) (detailing the various theories of corporation law). 
 10 See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy:  The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003) (describing the director primacy model as it 
relates to various aspects of corporation law); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team 
Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999) (arguing for a mediating 
hierarchy model as a solution to problems inherent in public corporations). 
 11 As will be discussed in more detail below, both my alignment of director-primacy/team-
production with real entity theory, and my conclusion that real entity theory had less of a 
role to play in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), than the 
contractarianism and concession theory, are at least somewhat controversial. 
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THEORY OF THE 
CORPORATION 
ALTERNATIVE 
DESIGNATION 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION 
RELEVANT TO 
OUTCOME IN CITIZENS 
UNITED? 
Entity  
The corporation is a 
separate legal entity 
that can, for exam-
ple, sue and be 
sued. 
No. 
Concession 
Artificial  
Entity 
The corporation is a 
creature of the state 
intended to benefit 
society as a whole. 
Yes.  The theory posits 
that the state has wide 
latitude in regulating 
its creation. 
Contract  
The corporate char-
ter represents a con-
tract between the 
state and incorpora-
tors. 
No. 
Nexus-of-contracts 
(Contractarianism) 
Aggregate 
The corporation is a 
creature of private 
contracting. 
Yes.  The theory posits 
that the state merely 
provides default rules 
to facilitate private 
ordering. 
Director-primacy & 
Team Production 
(Process)  
Real (Natu-
ral) Entity12 
The corporate locus 
of control resides in 
the board of direc-
tors, which focuses 
on coordinating the 
interests of all 
stakeholders. 
Perhaps, but arguably 
less so than contrac-
tarianism and conces-
sion theory. 
 
I will first briefly review entity theory, contract theory, and process theory 
(including director-primacy and team-production theory), before moving on 
to a more detailed overview of concession theory and nexus-of-contracts 
 
 12 See Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc.:  Citizens United, McDonald, and the Future of Corporate 
Constitutional Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887, 914 n.174 (2011) (“The real entity theory is 
also known as the natural entity theory.”). 
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theory.  I do this because I believe the entity, contract, and process theories 
have more limited roles to play in terms of their influence on the campaign 
finance cases I discuss herein, while the concession and nexus-of-contracts 
theories represent the two “preeminent” theories of the corporation.13 
A. The Entity, Contract, and Process Theories of the Corporation 
Entity theory simply posits that the corporation is indeed a separate legal 
entity capable, for example, of being sued and filing suit against others in its 
own name.14  This is to be contrasted with businesses operating in the 
general partnership form where, at least traditionally, the partnership was 
viewed as nothing more than an aggregation of the individual owners.15  
Indeed, it is the fact that the corporation stands as a separate legal entity 
between the owners and third parties that provides at least part of the 
justification for bestowing limited liability upon the owners.16  As compared 
to concession theory and nexus-of-contracts theory, however, the fact that 
the corporation is deemed a legal entity with the right to sue and be sued 
tells us little about where to draw the line on the state’s authority to regulate 
corporations. 
Contract theory, meanwhile, provides that “the charter of a corporation 
represents a contract (a) between the state and the corporation, or 
(b) between the corporation and its stockholders, or (c) among the 
stockholders.”17  This theory was most famously relied upon by the Supreme 
Court in its Dartmouth College decision, wherein the Court held that the State 
of New Hampshire would violate the Contracts Clause of the United States 
Constitution if it unilaterally amended the charter of Dartmouth College 
 
 13 Liam Séamus O’Melinn, Neither Contract nor Concession:  The Public Personality of the 
Corporation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 201, 201 (2006) (describing contractarianism and 
concession theory as “the two preeminent theories of the corporation”). 
 14 HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 9, at 327–28 (“A corporation may be most readily 
envisioned as an entity created for the purpose of conducting a business. . . . The entity 
has the power to . . . bring[] suits or be[] sued . . . .”). 
 15 Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Recurring Paradox of Groups in the Liberal State, 2010 UTAH L. 
REV. 47, 55–56 (2010) (“Because corporations are legal entities, the circumstances in 
which the law will look past the corporation to its individual owners and managers are 
limited.  Because partnerships are not legal entities, however, the situation is reversed:  
the circumstances in which the law will look to the partnership as an entity, rather than to 
its owners and managers, are limited.” (footnote omitted)). 
 16 Thomas C. Folsom, Evaluating Supernatural Law:  An Inquiry into the Health of Nations (The 
Restatement of the Obvious, Part II), 21 REGENT U. L. REV. 105, 148 (2008) (“Limited liability 
entities are based on the moral intuition of nonagency because there is separation of 
ownership from control.”). 
 17 HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 9, at 329. 
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without having reserved the right to do so in the original corporate 
charter.18  It is in this opinion that Justice Marshall also famously stated: 
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only 
in contemplation of law.  Being the mere creature of law, it possesses 
only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, 
either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence.  These are such as 
are supposed best calculated to effect the object for which it was 
created. . . . The objects for which a corporation is created are universally 
such as the government wishes to promote.  They are deemed beneficial 
to the country; and this benefit constitutes the consideration, and, in 
most cases, the sole consideration of the grant.19 
The theory now serves primarily as the justification for the ubiquity of 
reservation clauses in state corporate codes.20  It should also be noted here, 
and will be discussed in more detail below, that in addition to serving as the 
flagship opinion for the contract theory of the corporation, the preceding 
quoted language from Justice Marshall has also been further claimed 
primarily by concession theorists.21 
Process theory, meanwhile, views the corporation as “a process by which 
various inputs of capital, services, and raw materials are combined to 
produce desirable products.”22  As alluded to previously, for purposes of this 
Article, I am equating process theory with both the director-primacy and 
team-production theories of the corporation.  As I have written elsewhere: 
[I]t appears clear that director primacy and team production theory 
differ in terms of what they view as the goal of corporate governance.  
For director primacy, it is shareholder wealth maximization.  For team 
production theory, it is the maximization of “the joint welfare of all the 
 
 18 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 650 (1819) (“The opinion of the 
Court, after mature deliberation, is, that this [charter] is a contract, the obligation of 
which cannot be impaired, without violating the constitution of the United States.”). 
 19 Id. at 636–37. 
 20 See Ian S. Speir, Constitutional and Statutory Reservation Clauses and Constitutional 
Requirements of General Laws With Respect to Corporations:  The Fifty States and the District of 
Columbia 1 (Apr. 24, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1820868 (“Reservation 
clauses, reserving to the legislature a power to amend or repeal corporate charters, are 
included in the constitutions or corporation statutes of 49 states and the District of 
Columbia.”).  Cf. Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders:  Interpreting Corporate Constituency 
Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 69 (1992) (“Advocates of Contract Clause protection 
for shareholders are aware of the ‘reserve’ clauses resulting from Dartmouth College, but 
they appear to underestimate the full import of these powers.  States have ‘reserved’ the 
freedom . . . to ‘impair’ the rights of shareholders . . . .”). 
 21 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 971 n.72 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Dartmouth College as an example of 
concession theory). 
 22 HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 9, at 332. 
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firm’s stakeholders.”  However, both theories locate the ultimate 
decision-making power in the board of directors . . . .23 
It is precisely because both theories “locate the ultimate decision-making 
power in the board of directors” that I am equating them with Hamilton’s 
and Booth’s process theory.  That is to say, the board mediates the process.24 
Both team-production and director-primacy have been linked to 
contractarianism.  For example, J.W. Verret has noted that: 
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout’s team production model . . . relies on 
contractarian thinking . . . . In part the team production theory rests on a 
conception of the institution of corporate law as a solution for limitations 
in the ability of corporate constituencies to contract with each other . . . . 
[Instead,] the constituencies opt into their “mediating hierarchy” of the 
board of directors . . . .25 
Meanwhile, Stephen Bainbridge, “the leading proponent of the director 
primacy view,”26 also clearly aligns director-primacy with the nexus-of-
contracts view.27  Nonetheless, the reason why I believe the director-primacy 
and team-production theories should take a back-seat to concession theory 
and nexus-of-contracts theory in our discussion here is because even if those 
theories capture the current state of power allocation within the 
corporation, the question remains whether this state of affairs is a result of 
the market contracting for it or the state deeming it so.28  In other words, the 
more fundamental debate between contractarianism (market decides) and 
concession theory (state decides) remains regardless of what we conclude 
about the relevant validity of the director-primacy and team-production 
theories.  Furthermore, even if both the team-production and director-
 
 23 Stefan Padfield, Director-Primacy and Team-Production as Real Entity Theories, 
THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG (June 3, 2012), http://www.theracetothebottom.org/
home/director-primacy-and-team-production-as-real-entity-theories.html. 
 24 See Blair & Stout, supra note 10, at 250–51 (1999) (“In essence, the mediating hierarchy 
solution requires team members to give up important rights . . . to a legal entity created 
by the act of incorporation. . . . Within the corporation, control over . . . assets is 
exercised by an internal hierarchy . . . . At the peak of this hierarchy sits a board of 
directors . . . .”). 
 25 J.W. Verret, Treasury, Inc.:  How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory and Practice, 27 YALE J. 
ON REG. 283, 321–22 (2010) (footnotes omitted).  See also id. at 317 (“The contractarian 
model is in many ways a precursor to . . . the director primacy model.”). 
 26 Id. at 321. 
 27 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1, 
25 (2002) (“If the corporation has a nexus, however, where is it located?  The Delaware 
code, like the corporate law of every other state, gives us a clear answer:  the corporation’s 
‘business and affairs . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of 
directors.’  Put simply, the board is the nexus.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Del. Code 
Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001))). 
 28 See Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation, supra note 6, at 216 (“[P]recisely because the 
board of directors’ power comes from the state, [director-primacy] could also be viewed 
as supporting a concession theory view of the corporation.” (footnote omitted)). 
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primacy theories do indeed trace their roots back to contractarianism, it still 
arguably makes more sense to focus on the more fundamental theory of 
contractarianism (and its conventional sparring partner:  concession theory) 
before analyzing its various offspring.29 
Thus, while all the theories of the corporation described above can be 
useful, for purposes of this Article I will be focusing on the competing 
theories of nexus-of-contracts and concession.  As Liam O’Melinn has noted, 
while “[n]ot all theorists use the language of contract and concession,” the 
two “preeminent” theories of the corporation are the nexus-of-contracts 
theory and concession theory.30 
B. Concession and Nexus-of-Contracts Theory 
Hamilton and Booth describe concession theory simply as the theory 
“that a corporation is a grant or concession from the state.”31  Meanwhile, 
they describe nexus-of-contracts theory as follows: 
Economists have developed a theory of corporateness that permits 
analysis of the corporation as an economic phenomenon.  This theory 
rejects the notion that the stockholders are the ultimate owners of the 
enterprise but treats them, along with bondholders and other creditors, 
as providers of capital in anticipation of receiving a desired return.  The 
nexus of contracts theory assumes that corporate managers obtain the 
requirements of the corporation for capital, labor, materials, and services 
through a series of contractual relationships.32 
 
 29 To some extent, this may all be unnecessary hair-splitting because, as I will attempt to 
show below, the difference between real-entity theory (where I ultimately locate the team-
production and director-primacy theories) and contractarianism is potentially 
inconsequential in terms of the pro-regulatory/anti-regulatory debate because both real-
entity theory and contractarianism are typically used to justify deregulation in modern 
discourse. 
 30 See supra note 13, at 201 & n.3.  See also id. at 258 (discussing “concession theory 
and . . . its nexus of contracts counterpart”). 
 31 HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 9, at 328. 
 32 Id. at 330.  See generally Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation is a Nexus of 
Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819 (1999) (describing the history 
and limitations of the nexus of contracts conception). 
In 1976 Michael Jensen and William Meckling first formulated the conception that 
the corporation is a nexus of contracts . . . . Since that time, the conception has 
dominated the law-and-economics literature in corporate law. . . . [T]he 
intellectual history of . . . Jensen and Meckling . . . begins with Ronald 
Coase[] . . . [who] characterized the boundaries of the firm as the range of 
exchanges over which the market system was superseded and resource allocation 
was accomplished instead by authority and direction. . . . Armen Alchian and 
Harold Demsetz objected to the Coasian conception of the firm, and emphasized 
instead the role of team production within the firm and the role of agreement and 
monitoring in team production. . . . Jensen and Meckling applauded Alchian and 
Demsetz’s objection to Coase’s theory of the firm, but concluded that Alchian and 
Demsetz had not gone far enough in rejecting Coase . . . . Jensen and Meckling 
therefore substituted, for Coase’s conception of the firm, the competing 
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In differentiating these two theories, it may be helpful to refer to what David 
Millon describes as the three “dimensions” along which corporate theory has 
evolved:  (1) the corporation as a separate entity versus “a mere aggregation 
of natural individuals without a separate existence”; (2) the corporation as 
an “artificial creation of state law” versus a “natural product of private 
initiative”; and (3) the corporation as a public versus a private construct.33  
One may then align concession theory with a view of the corporation as a 
distinct, separate entity that is a creature of state law serving an ultimately 
public function, while nexus-of-contracts theory lines up with a view of the 
corporation as a mere aggregation of natural individuals that is a product of 
private initiative serving a predominantly private function.  One of the key 
distinctions flowing from all of this is that concession theory tends to 
support giving the state greater authority to regulate, while nexus-of-
contracts theory espouses private ordering.  Returning to Hamilton and 
Booth: 
According to the nexus of contracts model, it follows that the state 
should not—and indeed possibly may not—prescribe mandatory rules 
for corporations by statute that are inconsistent with the express or 
implicit contracts.  The role of corporation statutes, according to this 
theory, is to provide standardized rules that most corporations will adopt, 
thereby providing savings for corporations that do not need to incur the 
cost of independently drafting such provisions.34 
Some have suggested that concession theory is no longer viable because 
it is inexorably tied to a time in history when corporate status was bestowed 
by the states on a case-by-case basis via a special charter system.  For 
example, Henry Butler and Larry Ribstein have written that “[concession] 
theory had its origin in the early history of the corporation, when 
corporations were, in fact, created by special charter.  The theory has no 
relevance today, when corporations are freely formed by making a simple 
filing under general corporation laws.”35  However, I believe Grant Hayden 
 
conception that the firm was a nexus of contracts—and, more particularly, “that 
most organizations are simply legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting 
relationships among individuals . . . .” 
  Id. at 819–22 (internal footnotes omitted) (quoting Michael C. Jensen & William H. 
Meckling, Theory of the Firm:  Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. 
FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976)) (citing R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 
(1937); Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972)). 
 33 David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 201 (1990). 
 34 HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 9, at 330–31. 
 35 HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE CORPORATION AND THE CONSTITUTION, at ix 
(1995).  Larry Ribstein unfortunately and prematurely passed away on December 24, 
2011.  His impact on the legal academy cannot be overstated.  For a truly moving 
collection of remembrances, visit:  Geoffrey Manne, Larry Ribstein, RIP, TRUTH ON THE 
MARKET (Dec. 24, 2011), http://truthonthemarket.com/2011/12/24/larry-ribstein-rip/.  
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and Matthew Bodie espouse the better view when they note that:  “One 
cannot contract to form a corporation. . . . The fact that th[e] permission 
[to incorporate] is readily granted . . . does not change the fact that 
permission is required.”36  As I have written elsewhere: 
[Add together] the ubiquity of reserve clauses in corporate codes, the 
existence of stakeholder statutes, and relatively recent judicial 
pronouncements that “[c]orporations are creatures of the 
Legislature . . . [i]t is appropriate, therefore, that the terms and 
conditions of their existence be determined by that body,” and I would 
go so far as to label the argument that concession theory is necessarily 
tied to our special charter era a straw man.37 
Ultimately, anyone who feels compelled to tie the phrase “concession 
theory” to our special charter era should feel free to replace it herein with 
something more generic, like “the state-conferred benefits argument.”38 
Finally, and as already alluded to above, it is important to note that 
constitutional law scholars have tended to use a slightly different lexicon 
when discussing the role of corporate theory in the Supreme Court’s case 
law.  As Reuven Avi-Yonah describes it: 
Th[e] theories are the aggregate theory, which views the corporation as an 
aggregate of its members or shareholders; the artificial entity theory, which 
views the corporation as a creature of the State; and the real entity theory, 
which views the corporation as neither the sum of its owners nor an 
extension of the state, but as a separate entity controlled by its 
managers.39 
 
For myself, I noted that, “while there is obviously much in terms of scholarship that Larry 
is worth remembering for, what I will primarily remember him for is his inspiring 
kindness.”  Stefan J. Padfield, The Inspiring Kindness of Larry Ribstein, BUSINESS LAW PROF 
BLOG (Dec. 25, 2011), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2011/12/the-
inspiring-kindness-of-larry-ribstein.html. 
 36 Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Uncorporation and the Unraveling of “Nexus of 
Contracts” Theory, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1130 (2011) (footnote omitted).  Cf. Margaret 
M. Blair, The Four Functions of Corporate Personhood 4 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law 
& Legal Theory Working Paper, Paper No. 12-15, 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2037356 (“The four functions that legal entity status serve 
would be very difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish using only transactional 
contracts.”). 
 37 Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation, supra note 6, at 218 (footnotes omitted) (quoting 
Neary v. Miltronics Mfg. Servs., Inc., 534 F. Supp. 2d 227, 231 (D.N.H. 2008)) (citing 
Speir, supra note 20; Orts, supra note 20, at 69). 
 38 See David G. Yosifon, The Public Choice Problem in Corporate Law:  Corporate Social 
Responsibility After Citizens United, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1197, 1219 (2011) (discussing “The 
State-Conferred Benefits Argument”); see also Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation, supra 
note 6, at 218–20 (rejecting Yosifon’s assertion that the state-conferred benefits argument 
is one of the “‘tempting-but-ultimately-bad’ argument[s] . . . [for] regulating corporate 
political speech”). 
 39 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the Corporate Form, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 999, 1001 
(2010) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
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As I have also written elsewhere:  “[t]he aggregate theory is generally 
understood to capture the nexus-of-contracts view, the artificial entity theory 
captures concession theory, and the real entity theory arguably captures the 
director-primacy [and team-production] view of the corporation.”40  This last 
point, that the team-production and director-primacy theories are best 
aligned with real entity theory (rather than, for example, aggregate theory) 
is certainly not without its controversy.41  However, the director-primacy 
theory of the corporation has been described as espousing “the view that the 
maximization of shareholder wealth is the appropriate duty of directors . . . 
[and] that resting authority over corporate decisions with a self-sustaining 
board of directors is the best way to accomplish that objective,”42 and this 
indeed lines up well with real-entity theory, which “represents the most 
congenial view to corporate management, because it shields management 
from undue interference from both shareholders and the state.”43 
Thus having set the stage in terms of corporate theory, we turn now to 
the role of these theories in the Supreme Court’s campaign finance cases.  I 
will first examine the blockbuster Citizens United decision, followed by an 
analysis of the key Supreme Court precedents leading up to that decision. 
III.  THE ROLE OF CORPORATE THEORY IN THE SUPREME COURT’S 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE CASES 
A.  Citizens United 
Citizens United involved a challenge to a federal statute, the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act of 2002, which prohibited “corporations and unions 
from using their general treasury funds to make independent expenditures 
for speech defined as an ‘electioneering communication’ or for speech 
 
 40 Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation, supra note 6, at 215 (footnotes omitted). 
 41 Stephen Bainbridge rejects my argument that director-primacy theory is best aligned with 
real entity theory.  For a summary of our multi-blog post discussion of the issue, see 
http://www.theracetothebottom.org/home/the-silent-role-of-corporate-theory-in-the-
supreme-courts-ca-3.html.  Stefan Padfield, The Silent Rule of Corporate Theory in the Supreme 
Court’s Campaign Finance Cases (Part 4), THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG (Apr. 7, 2012, 5:46 
PM), http://www.theracetothebottom.org/home/the-silent-role-of-corporate-theory-in-
the-supreme-courts-ca-3.html.  On the other hand, Lynn Stout responded to my blog post 
entitled, Director-Primacy and Team-Production as Real Entity Theories, 
THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG (June 3, 2012, 9:09 AM), 
http://www.theracetothebottom.org/home/director-primacy-and-team-production-as-
real-entity-theories.html, with an e-mail asserting that my description of the issue was “as 
well put as I’ve seen it.”  E-mail from Professor Lynn Stout to author (June 3, 2012) (on 
file with author).  Cf. Blair & Stout, supra note 10. 
 42 Verret, supra note 25, at 321 (identifying Stephen Bainbridge as “the leading proponent 
of the director primacy view”). 
 43 Avi-Yonah, supra note 39, at 1032. 
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expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate.”44  The Supreme 
Court held, among other things, that the First Amendment prohibits the 
government from regulating the political speech of corporations on the 
basis of their corporate identity.45  In doing so, the majority relied on a view 
of the corporation as fundamentally an “association[] of citizens.”46  The 
dissent of Justice Stevens, meanwhile, saw corporations as state-created 
entities that:  (1) “differ from natural persons in fundamental ways”;47 
(2) “have no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires”;48 
and (3) “must engage the political process in instrumental terms if they are 
to maximize shareholder value.”49  Of particular note, the dissent asserted 
that “corporations have been ‘effectively delegated responsibility for 
ensuring society’s economic welfare.’”50 
Despite the foregoing, Avi-Yonah has argued that Citizens United does not 
in fact embody any corporate theory dispute because both the majority and 
dissent embraced real-entity theory, while merely disagreeing on the 
application of that theory to the facts of the case.51  As I have argued 
elsewhere, this contention is unpersuasive for at least three reasons.52  First, 
 
 44 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010) (citing 2 U.S.C. 
§ 441b (2002)).  See Tucker, supra note 4, at 512–13. 
Following Buckley, the Court in Bellotti similarly rejected the equalization and 
antidistortion rationales [for regulating corporate political speech] as being 
unsupported by the record.  Instead of rejecting the rationales wholesale, the 
Court emphasized the lack of a record justifying the restriction.  Alerted to the 
need to develop a record regarding distortion harms to support expenditure 
limits, Congress did so in passing the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act.  Those 
restrictions were subsequently recognized as valid in MCFL and Austin. 
  Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
 45 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 885 (“Government may not suppress political speech based on 
the speaker’s corporate identity.”) (overruling Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of 
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)). 
 46 See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 906–07 (asserting that the Court’s prior ruling in 
Austin “permits the Government to ban the political speech of millions of associations of 
citizens”); id. at 908 (asserting that under the challenged statute “certain disfavored 
associations of citizens—those that have taken on the corporate form—are penalized for 
engaging in . . . political speech”). 
 47 Id. at 971–72 n.72 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 48 Id. at 972. 
 49 Id. at 965. 
 50 Id. at 971 (quoting Milton C. Regan Jr., Corporate Speech and Civic Virtue, in DEBATING 
DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT:  ESSAYS ON AMERICAN POLITICS, LAW, AND PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 
289, 302 (Anita L. Allen & Milton C. Regan Jr. eds., 1998)). 
 51 Avi-Yonah, supra note 39, at 1040 (“What is remarkable about Citizens United . . . is that 
both the majority and the dissent adopted the real entity view of the corporation, so that 
their only disagreement was in divergent assessments of the implications for the First 
Amendment.”).  Cf. Tucker, supra note 4, at 505 (“The majority in Citizens United 
employed both the aggregation-of-rights and entity theory of corporations to reach its 
conclusion that corporate political speech is to be treated the same as individual political 
speech.”). 
 52 See Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation, supra note 6, at 224–26. 
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the majority’s emphasis on corporation-as-association-of-citizens is consistent 
with the rhetoric of prior judicial opinions that Avi-Yonah himself identifies 
as espousing the aggregate (i.e., contractarian) view.53  Second, Avi-Yonah’s 
suggestion that “association-of-citizens” in Citizens United should be equated 
with “corporate management working together as an association of persons” 
because to equate it with the aggregate view would be to align the majority 
opinion with the shareholder rights argument the majority rejected is belied 
by the fact that (a) when the government argues that its regulations should 
be upheld in order to protect shareholders, it is typically best understood as 
advancing a concession theory argument and thus, “to reject the state’s 
argument here is to reject concession theory, not the aggregate view,”54 and 
(b) such a narrow interpretation of “association of citizens” is inconsistent 
with the much broader use of that phrase in similar contexts by Justice 
Scalia, whose concurring opinion Avi-Yonah focuses on in making his 
“association of managers” argument.55  Finally, as far as the dissent is 
concerned, suffice it to say that I am not alone in seeing concession theory 
jumping off the pages.  Stephen Bainbridge entitled one of his blog posts 
following the release of the opinion, “Stevens’ Pernicious Version of the 
Concession Theory.”56 
Thus, I agree with Larry Ribstein, who was quoted as saying that “Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion and Justice Stevens’ dissent represent 
diametrically opposed views of the corporation.”57  Furthermore, the 
centrality of corporate theory in Citizens United is not negated by the fact that 
other considerations, like the listeners’ rights rationale mentioned above, 
were also very important.  As Anne Tucker explained: 
In Buckley and Bellotti, the Court thwarted attempts to restrict 
corporate political speech on the grounds that (1) speech is money; 
(2) corporations contribute to the political marketplace of ideas; 
 
 53 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 39, at 1013, 1016 (quoting Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 
(1906); Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 189 
(1888); Cnty. of Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 18 F. 385, 402–03 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883)). 
 54 See Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation, supra note 6, at 225 (“[I]t is the artificial entity 
[concession] view, rather than the aggregate view, which favors regulatory solutions.”). 
 55 See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 679 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“‘Attention all citizens.  To assure the fairness of elections by preventing 
disproportionate expression of the views of any single powerful group, your Government 
has decided that the following associations of persons shall be prohibited from speaking 
or writing in support of any candidate:  _____.’”). 
 56 Stephen Bainbridge, Citizens United v. FEC:  Stevens’ Pernicious Version of the Concession 
Theory, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Jan. 21, 2010, 4:05 PM), 
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2010/01/citizens-united-
v-fec-stevens-pernicious-version-of-the-concession-theory.html.  
 57 Larry E. Ribstein, Citizens United v. FEC:  A Roundtable Discussion, FEDERALIST SOC’Y FOR 
L. & PUB. POL’Y STUD. (Feb. 3, 2010), http://www.fed-soc.org/debates/
dbtid.38/default.asp. 
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(3) there is no special threat of distortion or need to equalize individual 
and corporate voices; (4) corporate political speech implicates freedom 
of association rights; and (5) concerns of compelled shareholder speech 
do not justify restricting corporate political speech.  In subsequent cases 
such as Massachusetts Citizens for Life (“MCFL”) and Austin, however, the 
Court utilized some of these same arguments to explain or validate 
certain restrictions on corporate political speech.  Later, in Citizens 
United, however, the Court employed the same lines of reasoning 
advanced in the cases discussed below, to equalize corporate and 
individual speech thus expanding corporate First Amendment rights.  
The Court’s application of these common arguments—as either an attack 
against or support for corporate political speech restrictions—depends 
on both the Court’s constitutional conceptualization of corporations and 
its assumptions about the roles, rights, and responsibilities of 
corporations in our economic and legal society.58 
What then becomes so striking is the majority’s silence on the issue of 
corporate theory along with the dissent’s express disavowal of any role for 
corporate theory.  Wrote Justice Stevens:  “Nothing in this analysis turns on 
whether the corporation is conceptualized as a grantee of a state 
concession, . . . a nexus of explicit and implicit contracts, . . . a mediated 
hierarchy of stakeholders, . . . or any other recognized model.”59  I have 
written elsewhere that there are a number of possible explanations for this 
apparent contradiction, including “(1) federalism concerns; (2) a failure to 
appreciate the significance of corporate theory; and/or (3) a desire to avoid 
the appearance of imposing unconstitutional conditions on 
incorporation.”60 
As for the federalism concerns, the Supreme Court has itself described 
corporations as “entities whose very existence and attributes are a product of 
state law.”61  As I have written elsewhere:  “Would the Court now turn around 
and tell states what they had created?”62  Even with the Court avoiding a 
direct confrontation on this issue by focusing on listeners’ rights rather than 
corporate theory, at least some states are still nonetheless pushing back.  For 
example, in Western Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Attorney General, the Montana 
Supreme Court upheld state campaign finance laws targeting corporations 
despite the obvious conflict with Citizens United,63 because “unlike Citizens 
 
 58 Tucker, supra note 4, at 509. 
 59 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 971 n.72 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. 
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 12 (1996); Blair & Stout, supra 
note 10 )). 
 60 Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation, supra note 6, at 226–27 (footnotes omitted). 
 61 CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987). 
 62 Padfield, Citizens United and the Nexus-of-Contracts Presumption, supra note 8, at 27. 
 63 Western Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 271 P.3d 1, 13 (Mont. 2011). 
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United, this case concerns Montana law, Montana elections and it arises from 
Montana history.”64 
The majority and dissent in Citizens United may also have simply failed to 
recognize the significance of corporate theory.  In other words, both sides 
may have felt their view of the corporation was so obviously correct as to not 
require further discussion.  One can perhaps see this perspective in action in 
the very footnote in which Justice Stevens disavows any role for corporate 
theory.  It is in this footnote that he states as a simple matter of fact that:  “It 
is not necessary to agree on a precise theory of the corporation to agree that 
corporations differ from natural persons in fundamental ways, and that a 
legislature might therefore need to regulate them differently if it is human 
welfare that is the object of its concern.”65  Yet the contention that 
corporations are fundamentally more than mere associations of citizens, and 
therefore subject to special regulation, directly implicates concession theory 
and is precisely the type of conceptualization of corporations that the 
majority rejected. 
Finally, the dissent may have been motivated to avoid the issue of 
corporate theory for fear of setting off an “unconstitutional conditions” 
debate.66  The majority asserted that:  “It is rudimentary that the State 
cannot exact as the price of those special [corporate] advantages the 
forfeiture of First Amendment rights.”67  If one understands concession 
theory to justify state regulation of corporations on the basis of their special 
status under state law, then avoiding concession theory may allow one to 
avoid allegations of imposing unconstitutional conditions.68 
 
 64 Id. at 6; see also id. at 11 (“The question then, is when in the last 99 years did Montana lose 
the power or interest sufficient to support the statute, if it ever did.”).  Shortly before this 
Article was finalized, the United States Supreme Court summarily reversed the Montana 
decision.  Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) (per curiam). 
 65 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 971 n.72 (2010). 
 66 See 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 395 (1998) (“The ‘doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions’ holds that the government ordinarily may not grant a benefit on the 
condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the government 
may withhold that benefit altogether.”). 
 67 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 905 (quoting Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 
494 U.S. 652, 680 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 68 But cf. Michael Boardman, Constitutional Conditions:  Regulating Independent Political 
Expenditures by Government Contractors After Citizens United, 10 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 25, 44–
45 (2011) (“[T]he unconstitutional conditions doctrine . . . applies where the 
government conditions a discretionary benefit with the waiver of a fundamental 
right . . . . To satisfy the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the restriction at issue must 
have a substantial nexus with the purpose of the [benefit]. . . . At face value, restrictions 
on political speech by government contractors have little to do with the purpose of the 
contracts themselves—contracts for Lockheed Martin to build airplanes, for example, 
would not necessarily be substantially related to their right to engage in political 
speech.”).  See generally Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc.:  Citizens United, McDonald, and 
the Future of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887, 929 n.278 (2011) (citing 
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Regardless, the weight of the rhetoric in the opinion that I have set forth 
above indicates that there is indeed a silent corporate theory debate raging 
in Citizens United.  This has led me to question whether this silent debate was 
unique to Citizens United or something that had been going on for some 
time.  In order to find out, I went back and reviewed the major Supreme 
Court campaign finance cases relied upon in Citizens United.  What follows 
are the results of my review. 
B.  The Cases Leading Up to Citizens United 
The primary campaign finance cases that the Citizens United Court relied 
upon were (in chronological order)69: (1) Buckley v. Valeo (1976);70 (2) First 
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti (1978);71 (3) Federal Election Commission v. 
National Right to Work Committee (1982) (“NRWC”);72 (4) Federal Election 
Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (1986) (“MCFL”);73 (5) Austin 
v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce (1990);74 (6) McConnell v. Federal Election 
Commission (2003);75 and (7) Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to 
Life, Inc. (2007) (“WRTL”).76  I will briefly review each of these cases below, 
focusing particularly on what I see as the role corporate theory played in 
 
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 113–15 (1993) (discussing the 
protection of corporate First Amendment speech as requiring an “unconstitutional 
conditions” analysis); Richard A. Epstein, Citizens United v. FEC:  The Constitutional Right 
That Big Corporations Should Have But Do Not Want, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639, 650 
(2011) (discussing the free speech benefits of the Lochner era); Larry E. Ribstein, The 
Constitutional Conception of the Corporation, 4 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 95, 96 (1995) (noting 
that although issues related to constitutional limits on government power over 
corporations “generally have been examined through the broad lens of constitutional 
law, their resolution has in fact often depended on how the corporation is 
characterized”); see also id. at 105–08 (discussing and criticizing Epstein’s 
“unconstitutional conditions” model)).   
 69 The six most cited cases in Citizens United in order of citation frequency were:  (1) Austin 
v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990); (2) McConnell v. Fed. 
Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); (3) Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per 
curiam); (4) First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); (5) Fed. Election 
Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007); and (6) Fed. Election Comm’n v. 
Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986).  Cf. Tucker, supra note 4, at 508 (“In 
applying the First Amendment to corporations, four cases are essential to understand the 
constitutional trajectory of the corporate political speech doctrine prior to Citizens United:  
Buckley v. Valeo, First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 
Inc., and Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 70 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
 71 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (striking down regulation of corporate political speech). 
 72 459 U.S. 197 (1982) (upholding regulation of corporate political speech). 
 73 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (striking down regulation of corporate political speech). 
 74 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (upholding regulation of corporate political speech). 
 75 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (upholding regulation of corporate political speech). 
 76 551 U.S. 449 (2007) (striking down regulation of corporate political speech). 
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each.  I ultimately argue that corporate theory was relevant in five of the 
seven cases. 
Because I want to focus on the corporate-theory aspects of these cases, it 
makes sense to begin at the end of the list because WRTL is one of the cases 
listed that does not really have much to say about corporate theory (the 
other is Buckley).  After explaining why WRTL was nonetheless so heavily 
relied upon in Citizens United, I will address the remaining cases in 
chronological order. 
1. Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. 
In WRTL, the Court “found an unconstitutional application of § 441b 
where the speech was not ‘express advocacy or its functional equivalent.’”77  
The Court thus adopted “an objective ‘appeal to vote’ test for determining 
whether a communication was the functional equivalent of express 
advocacy.”78  The reason WRTL was subsequently so hotly debated in Citizens 
United is that the dissent took WRTL to stand for the proposition that it was 
possible to deal with cases like Citizens United on an as-applied basis, and that 
to go on to invalidate the statute under a facial challenge was essentially to 
repudiate WRTL without any record to suggest the approach adopted in 
WRTL was a failure.79  Rather, the dissent argued that WRTL in fact not only 
stood for the proposition that § 441b was constitutional, but actually made it 
more likely that the corporate independent expenditure provision being 
challenged was valid even in light of Buckley (which had held that restriction 
of independent expenditures by individuals violated the First Amendment, 
while restriction of direct contributions to candidates did not)80 because it 
narrowed the types of speech that would be restricted under § 441b and thus 
increased the likelihood that those expenditures covered by the statute post-
 
 77 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 889 (2010) (quoting WRTL, 551 
U.S. at 481); see also WRTL, 551 U.S. at 449 (“Section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) makes it a federal crime for a corporation to use its general 
treasury funds to pay for any ‘electioneering communication.’” (quoting 2 U.S.C. 
§ 441b(b)(2) (2006)). 
 78 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 895 (quoting WRTL, 551 U.S. at 470). 
 79 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 933 n.5 (Stephens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (“[T]he majority’s argument for striking down § 203 depends on its contention that 
the statute has proved too ‘chilling’ in practice—and in particular on the contention that 
the controlling opinion in WRTL . . . failed to bring sufficient clarity and ‘breathing 
space’ to this area of law. . . . We have no record with which to assess that claim.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 80 See id. at 964–65 (“Buckley expressly contemplated that an anticorruption rationale might 
justify restrictions on independent expenditures at a later date, ‘because it may be that, in 
some circumstances, “large independent expenditures pose the same dangers of actual or 
apparent quid pro quo arrangements as do large contributions.”’” (quoting WRTL, 551 
U.S. at 478)). 
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WRTL would facilitate corruption in a way that justified restriction under the 
First Amendment.81  Obviously, the Citizens United majority vehemently 
disagreed that WRTL constituted any sort of a roadblock on its march to 
invalidate the statute, or that to do so would somehow repudiate WRTL.82  
However, there was no identifiable corporate theory dispute in WRTL that 
would be relevant to our discussion here. 
2. Buckley v. Valeo 
In Buckley, the Supreme Court held that federal statutory provisions 
limiting individual contributions to campaigns were constitutional, but that 
provisions limiting individual independent expenditures impermissibly 
abridged freedom of speech.83  As provided by statute: 
The term “independent expenditure” means an expenditure by a 
person—(A) expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly 
identified candidate; and (B) that is not made in concert or cooperation 
with or at the request or suggestion of such candidate, the candidate’s 
authorized political committee, or their agents, or a political party 
committee or its agents.84 
Buckley also did not directly address corporate political speech, but 
constitutes important precedent for Citizens United because it differentiated 
direct contributions from independent expenditures.85  There is thus little in 
 
 81 See id. at 967 n.66 (“[T]he notion that the ‘electioneering communications’ covered by 
§ 203 can breed quid pro quo corruption or the appearance of such corruption has only 
become more plausible since we decided McConnell. . . . [A]fter WRTL, a corporate or 
union expenditure could be regulated under § 203 only if everyone would understand it 
as an endorsement of or attack on a particular candidate for office.  It does not take 
much imagination to perceive why this type of advocacy might be especially apt to look 
like or amount to a deal or a threat.” (quoting WRTL, 551 U.S. at 465)). 
 82 Id. at 918 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“This case is different—not, as the dissent suggests, 
because the approach taken in WRTL has been deemed a ‘failure,’ . . . but because, in the 
absence of any valid narrower ground of decision, there is no way to avoid Citizens 
United’s broader constitutional argument.” (citation omitted)). 
 83 Id. at 901–02 (majority opinion) (“The Buckley Court explained that the potential for quid 
pro quo corruption distinguished direct contributions to candidates from independent 
expenditures.  The Court emphasized that ‘the independent expenditure ceiling . . . fails 
to serve any substantial governmental interest in stemming the reality or appearance of 
corruption in the electoral process,’ . . . because ‘[t]he absence of prearrangement and 
coordination . . . alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for 
improper commitments from the candidate.’” (citations omitted) (quoting Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47–48 (1976)). 
 84 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (2006). 
 85 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 902 (“Buckley did not consider § 610’s separate ban on 
corporate and union independent expenditures . . . .”); id. at 954  (Stevens, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (“Buckley famously (or infamously) distinguished direct 
contributions from independent expenditures, . . . but its silence on corporations only 
reinforced the understanding that corporate expenditures could be treated differently 
from individual expenditures. (citation omitted)). 
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the way of silent corporate theory at work in Buckley.  However, the statement 
in the per curiam opinion that “the concept that government may restrict 
the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative 
voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment,”86 arguably 
becomes a tool of the aggregate view of the corporation advanced by the 
majority in Citizens United insofar as corporations are there deemed to be just 
another “element[] of our society.”87 
3. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti 
In Bellotti, the Court overturned a criminal statute prohibiting 
corporations from making expenditures to influence the outcome of a vote 
on any question other than questions materially affecting the business of the 
corporation.88  Here, the issue of corporate political speech is front and 
center, yet there is again no express discussion of particular theories of the 
corporation.89  Rather, we can see the silent corporate theory debate 
between contract and concession in some of the language used by the 
majority and dissent.  For example, one can see the contractarian view of 
corporations as equivalent to other associations of citizens when the majority 
says:  “The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for 
informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, 
whether corporation, association, union, or individual.”90  Likewise, the 
 
 86 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48–49.  John Rawls focused on this quote in criticizing Buckley: 
The Court fails to recognize the essential point that the fair value of the political 
liberties is required for a just political procedure, and that to insure their fair value 
it is necessary to prevent those with greater property and wealth, and the greater 
skills of organization which accompany them, from controlling the electoral 
process to their advantage. 
  JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM:  EXPANDED EDITION 360 (2005).  See also id. at 359 
(“Buckley and its sequel First National Bank [v. Bellotti] are profoundly dismaying.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 87 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904; see also id. at 957 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“The majority emphasizes Buckley’s statement that ‘the concept that 
government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance 
the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.’”). 
 88 First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).  See also id. at 785 n.22 (“We know 
of no documentation of the notion that corporations are likely to share a monolithic view 
on an issue such as the adoption of a graduated personal income tax.  Corporations, like 
individuals or groups, are not homogeneous.” (emphasis added)).  It should be noted here 
that it is, however, not too difficult to imagine large swaths of corporations being united 
in opposing all sorts of cost-imposing regulation. 
 89 Cf. id. at 823 n.1 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court today affirms that the failure of 
[some prior] cases to draw distinctions between artificial and natural persons does not 
mean that no such distinctions may be drawn.  The Court explicitly states that 
corporations may not enjoy all the political liberties of natural persons, although it fails to 
articulate the basis of its suggested distinction.”). 
 90 Id. at 777 (majority opinion). 
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contractarian notion that corporations, as mere associations of citizens, start 
with the presumption of rights akin to other associations (with the burden of 
proof on those who would limit such rights), can be seen when the majority 
finds “no support in the First or Fourteenth Amendment, or in the decisions 
of this Court, for the proposition that speech that otherwise would be within 
the protection of the First Amendment loses that protection simply because 
its source is a corporation.”91  Finally, the majority clearly placed itself in 
opposition to the concession view when it characterized as “extreme” the 
view that “corporations, as creatures of the State, have only those rights 
granted them by the State.”92 
The Bellotti dissent of Justice White (joined by Justice Brennan and 
Justice Marshall), on the other hand, employed language very much 
consistent with a concession view of corporations: 
Corporations are artificial entities created by law for the purpose of 
furthering certain economic goals.  In order to facilitate the achievement 
of such ends, special rules relating to such matters as limited liability, 
perpetual life, and the accumulation, distribution, and taxation of assets 
are normally applied to them.  States have provided corporations with 
such attributes in order to increase their economic viability and thus 
strengthen the economy generally.  It has long been recognized however, 
that the special status of corporations has placed them in a position to 
control vast amounts of economic power which may, if not regulated, 
dominate not only the economy but also the very heart of our 
democracy, the electoral process.93 
Furthermore, the dissent of then-Justice Rehnquist quoted with approval the 
language from Dartmouth College that Justice Stevens cited as an example of 
concession theory in Citizens United:94 
Early in our history, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall described the status of a 
corporation in the eyes of federal law:  “A corporation is an artificial 
being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.  
Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which 
the charter of creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental 
to its very existence.  These are such as are supposed best calculated to 
effect the object for which it was created.”95 
Thus, it is fair to read Bellotti as embodying the same type of silent corporate 
theory debate as I have identified in Citizens United. 
 
 91 Id. at 784. 
 92 Id. at 778 n.14. 
 93 Id. at 809 (White, J., dissenting).  See also id. (“The State need not permit its own creation 
to consume it.”). 
 94 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 971 n.72 (Stevens, J., 
concurring and dissenting) (citing Dartmouth College as example of concession theory). 
 95 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 823 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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Interestingly, Justice Rehnquist’s stand-alone dissent in Bellotti provides 
arguably the sole example in these opinions of a Justice affirmatively 
adopting a theory of the corporation for purposes of determining the 
constitutional rights of corporations—though not via the express adoption 
of one of the traditionally recognized theories.  Specifically, Justice 
Rehnquist relied on Justice Marshall’s Dartmouth College opinion to conclude 
that:  “Since it cannot be disputed that the mere creation of a corporation 
does not invest it with all the liberties enjoyed by natural persons . . . our 
inquiry must seek to determine which constitutional protections are 
‘incidental to its very existence.’”96  Thus, while it may be true that “a 
corporation’s right of commercial speech . . . might be considered 
necessarily incidental to the business of a commercial corporation[, i]t 
cannot be so readily concluded that the right of political expression is 
equally necessary to carry out the functions of a corporation organized for 
commercial purposes.”97  I would argue that this is a formulation most 
aligned with concession theory because not only does Justice Rehnquist rely 
on Dartmouth College, but he also goes on to say:  “I would think that any 
particular form of organization upon which the State confers special 
privileges or immunities different from those of natural persons would be 
subject to like regulation, whether the organization is a labor union, a 
partnership, a trade association, or a corporation.”98 
4. Federal Election Commission v. National Right to Work 
Committee 
In NRWC, a unanimous Supreme Court upheld the Federal Election 
Campaign Act’s prohibition against corporations making political 
contributions from their general treasury.  It did so by upholding the 
Federal Election Commission’s determination that NRWC, a political action 
committee, had violated the Act by soliciting contributions from persons 
who were not its “members.”99  That is to say, the Court upheld a restriction 
 
 96 Id. at 824 (citation omitted) (quoting Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 
636 (1819)). 
 97 Id. at 825 (footnote omitted).  Cf. id. at 827 (“One need not adopt such a restrictive view 
of the political liberties of business corporations to affirm the judgment of the Supreme 
Judicial Court in this case.  That court reasoned that this Court’s decisions entitling the 
property of a corporation to constitutional protection should be construed as recognizing 
the liberty of a corporation to express itself on political matters concerning that 
property.”).  
 98 Id. at 826–27. 
 99 Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 198 n.1 (1982) (“The 
term ‘contribution’ is defined broadly, 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C), to include any sort of 
transfer of money or services to various political entities, but excluded from that 
definition is ‘the establishment, administration, and solicitation of contributions to a 
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on corporate political speech.  In doing so, the Court deferred to 
Congressional determinations regarding corruption and the dangers 
inherent in the corporate form.  Specifically, the Court held that the state-
granted “special advantages” of the corporate form justified state regulation 
to prevent abuse.  The Court stated: 
The first purpose of § 441b, [the government] states, is to ensure that 
substantial aggregations of wealth amassed by the special advantages 
which go with the corporate form of organization should not be 
converted into political “war chests” which could be used to incur 
political debts from legislators who are aided by the contributions. . . . 
The second purpose . . . is to protect the individuals who have paid 
money into a corporation . . . . We agree . . . that these purposes are 
sufficient to justify the regulation at issue.100 
Since this was a unanimous opinion, there is no opposing side of any 
corporate theory debate present.101  Nonetheless, in terms of a running 
theme within all the opinions I discuss herein, NRWC stands as yet another 
place where rhetoric consistent with concession theory is aligned with 
deferring to state regulation of corporate speech. 
5. Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for 
Life, Inc. 
In MCFL, the Court created an exception to the Federal Election 
Campaign Act for any corporation that:  (1) was formed for the express 
purpose of promoting political ideas, and cannot engage in business 
activities; (2) has no shareholders or other persons affiliated so as to have a 
claim on its assets or earnings; and, (3) was not established by a business 
corporation or a labor union, and it is its policy not to accept contributions 
from such entities.102  The Court arguably relied on a contractarian view of 
the corporation in order to limit the scope of regulation.  Said the majority:  
“Voluntary political associations do not suddenly present the specter of 
 
separate segregated fund to be utilized for political purposes by a . . . corporation without 
capital stock.’”). 
100 Id. at 207–08.  See also id. at 209 (“The statute reflects a legislative judgment that the 
special characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly careful regulation.”).  
Cf. id. at 210 (“[T]he ‘differing structures and purposes’ of different entities ‘may require 
different forms of regulation in order to protect the integrity of the electoral process.’” 
(quoting Cal. Med. Ass’n v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 453 U.S. 182, 201 (1981))). 
101 Cf. Charles N. Eberhardt, Note, Integrating the Right of Association with the Bellotti Right to 
Hear—Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life, Inc., 72 CORNELL 
L. REV. 159, 176 n.110 (1986) (“Arguably, NRWC turns on the kind of expression 
involved:  the solicitations in question resembled contributions more than expenditures 
and as such merited less first amendment protection under the Buckley rule.”). 
102 Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 264 (1986). 
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corruption merely by assuming the corporate form.”103  The majority also 
expressly tried to recast earlier pro-regulatory opinions as not constituting 
referendums on the corporate form:  “Regulation of corporate political 
activity . . . has reflected concern not about use of the corporate form per se, 
but about the potential for unfair deployment of wealth for political 
purposes.”104 
The dissent in MCFL, meanwhile, expressed disappointment at what it 
saw as the Court turning away from precedent that had acknowledged that 
the unique state-conferred benefits bestowed on corporations could justify 
limitations on corporate political speech.  Specifically, in Federal Election 
Commission v. National Conservative Political Action Committee (“NCPAC”),105 the 
Court had declined to extend NRWC’s restriction of corporate political 
speech to Political Action Committees (“PACs”).  The Court in NCPAC had 
said:  “While in NRWC we held that the compelling governmental interest in 
preventing corruption supported the restriction of the influence of political 
war chests funneled through the corporate form, in the present cases we do 
not believe that a similar finding is supportable . . . . Even assuming that 
Congress could fairly conclude that large-scale PACs have a sufficient 
tendency to corrupt, the overbreadth of § 9012(f) in these cases is so great 
that the section may not be upheld.”106  The MCFL dissent read NCPAC as 
continuing  
to recognize what had been, until today, an acceptable distinction, 
grounded in the judgment of the political branch, between political 
activity by corporate actors and that by organizations not benefiting from 
‘the corporate shield which the State [has] granted to corporations as a 
form of quid pro quo’ for various regulations.107   
Given that the state-conferred benefits argument advanced by the dissent in 
MCFL is properly aligned with concession theory, MCFL can be read as 
another case wherein a silent corporate theory debate was at work. 
6. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce 
In Austin, one of the two main decisions overruled by Citizens United, the 
Supreme Court held that the unique state-conferred corporate structure 
 
103 Id. at 263. 
104 Id. at 259 (footnote omitted). 
105 470 U.S. 480 (1985). 
106 Id. at 500–01 
107 479 U.S. 238, 270 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Citizens Against Rent 
Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 300 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)); see also id. at 
267 (“In light of the ‘special advantages that the State confers on the corporate form,’ . . . 
we have considered these [anti-corruption and shareholder protection] dangers 
sufficient to justify restrictions on corporate political activity.” (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)). 
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which facilitates the amassing of large treasuries warrants limits on corporate 
independent expenditures.108  Said the Court: 
State law grants corporations special advantages—such as limited liability, 
perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and 
distribution of assets—that enhance their ability to attract capital and to 
deploy their resources in ways that maximize the return on their 
shareholders’ investments.  These state-created advantages not only allow 
corporations to play a dominant role in the Nation’s economy, but also 
permit them to use “resources amassed in the economic marketplace” to 
obtain “an unfair advantage in the political marketplace.”109 
In dissent, Justice Scalia made clear that he viewed distinctions based 
solely on the corporate form to be insidious because corporations were just 
one of many types of associations of citizens:  “Attention all citizens.  To 
assure the fairness of elections by preventing disproportionate expression of 
the views of any single powerful group, your Government has decided that 
the following associations of persons shall be prohibited from speaking or 
writing in support of any candidate: _____.”110  The contractarian point of 
view here could not be starker—corporations are literally interchangeable 
with any other association. 
7. McConnell v. Federal Election Commission 
Finally, in the other major case Citizens United overruled, McConnell v. 
Federal Election Commission, the Court upheld the Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act’s (“BCRA”) extension (via § 203) of § 441b’s restrictions on 
independent corporate expenditures.111  The majority again relied upon 
what can fairly be characterized as an artificial entity view:  “[W]hether the 
state interest is compelling—is easily answered by our prior decisions 
regarding campaign finance regulation, which ‘represent respect for the 
“legislative judgment that the special characteristics of the corporate 
 
108 Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).  See Citizens United v. 
Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 903 (2010) (“[In Austin,] the Michigan Chamber 
of Commerce sought to use general treasury funds to run a newspaper ad supporting a 
specific candidate.  Michigan law, however, prohibited corporate independent 
expenditures that supported or opposed any candidate for state office.  A violation of the 
law was punishable as a felony.  The Court sustained the speech prohibition.”). 
109 Id. at 658–59. 
110 Id. at 679 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
111 540 U.S. 93, 132 (2003) (“BCRA’s central provisions are designed to address Congress’ 
concerns about the increasing use of soft money and issue advertising to influence 
federal elections. . . . Title II primarily prohibits corporations and labor unions from 
using general treasury funds for communications that are intended to, or have the effect 
of, influencing the outcome of federal elections.”). 
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structure require particularly careful regulation.”’”112  The dissent, 
meanwhile, repeated the “mere association” refrain:   
In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utility Commission of California, . . . we 
held unconstitutional a state effort to compel corporate speech.  “The 
identity of the speaker,” we said, “is not decisive in determining whether 
speech is protected.  Corporations and other associations, like 
individuals, contribute to the ‘discussion, debate, and the dissemination 
of information and ideas’ that the First Amendment seeks to foster.”113 
This review of the primary campaign finance cases leading up to, and 
relied upon in, Citizens United should make clear that an on-going debate 
about the nature of corporations has been central to the resolution of these 
cases, despite the fact that none of the opinions have expressly referenced 
corporate theory.  So, what are we to make of this silent corporate theory 
debate?  The answer I propose here is to call on all judges in relevant cases 
to expressly state their views about which corporate theory is best.  This 
should improve the transparency of judicial opinions, as well as the 
accountability of judges.  What follows is a brief overview of just a couple of 
the ways the issue of corporate theory continues to make its way before the 
Court post-Citizens United.  The cases discussed demonstrate that, not 
surprisingly, the status of corporations in our modern society is not an issue 
that is going to go away any time soon. 
IV.  JUDGING CORPORATIONS POST-CITIZENS UNITED 
While the Citizens United decision cautions against betting on the 
corporate theory debate being addressed expressly by the Court any time 
soon, there should be no shortage of opportunities to challenge the Court 
on that point, since cases raising the question of what corporations are, and 
how we should best conceptualize them, are likely to continue to confront 
the Court with regularity.  By way of example, one can examine the case of 
Federal Communications Commission v. AT&T, which followed Citizens United by 
little more than a year and examined whether the Freedom of Information 
Act’s protection of “personal privacy” protects the “privacy” of corporate 
entities.114  The Court ultimately decided the case on the basis of statutory 
construction:  “‘Person’ is a defined term in the statute [and expressly 
includes corporations]; ‘personal’ is not.  When a statute does not define a 
term, we typically ‘give the phrase its ordinary meaning.’ . . . ‘Personal’ 
ordinarily refers to individuals.”115  However, the case simply begs the 
 
112 Id. at 205 (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155 (2003)). 
113 Id. at 257 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) (citation omitted) (quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. 
Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)). 
114 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1180 (2011). 
115 Id. at 1182 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265, 1267 (2010)). 
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question of whether corporations should have personal privacy rights.  Wrote 
Stephen Bainbridge in response to the opinion: 
I agree . . . [with the] concern that US law confers personhood on the 
corporation without a coherent theory of why it does so or where the 
boundaries of that legal fiction are to be located.  As I complained after 
the recent AT&T decision:  Chief Justice Roberts could have summed up 
his opinion far more succinctly:  “Because at least 5 of us say so.”  The 
Citizens United decision last term [also] attracted much criticism . . . for 
holding that a corporation is a person and as such has certain 
constitutional rights.  While I agreed with the holding, I was disturbed 
that the Chief Justice’s majority opinion for the Supreme Court so 
obviously lacked a coherent theory of the nature of the corporation and, 
as such, also lacked a coherent theory of what legal rights the 
corporation possesses.  The utterly specious word games that drive this 
opinion simply confirm that Chief Justice Roberts has failed to articulate 
a plausible analytical framework for this important problem.116 
The Court will continue to subject itself to similar criticism so long as it 
declines to expressly adopt a “plausible analytical framework” in the form of 
a particular theory of the corporation. 
Looking ahead, in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,117 the Court will 
soon be addressing the question whether federal courts in the United States 
may exercise jurisdiction over corporations pursuant to the Alien Tort 
Statute, which gives federal courts “original jurisdiction of any civil action by 
an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a 
treaty of the United States.”118  The Second Circuit, in ruling on the case 
below, identified the relevant issue as “the treatment of corporations as a 
matter of customary international law.”119  This may at first blush suggest 
corporate theory is irrelevant because the question is not why corporations 
 
116 Stephen Bainbridge, Schumpeter on Corporate Personhood, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Mar. 
26, 2011, 6:43 PM), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/
2011/03/schumpeter-on-corporate-personhood.html. 
117 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 10-
1491).  See John Bellinger, Kiobel:  Supplemental Briefs on Extraterritoriality are In…, 
LAWFARE (Aug. 14, 2012, 10:52 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/08/kiobel-
supplemental-briefs-on-extraterritoriality-are-in/ (“[I]n March the Supreme Court 
ordered the case of Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum to be re-briefed and reargued to address 
the additional question of whether the Alien Tort Statute applies to violations of 
international law occurring in the sovereign territory of other countries.  The final 
supplemental briefs were filed on August 8.”). 
118 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
119 Kiobel, 621 F.3d 111, 117 n.11 (2d Cir. 2010) (emphasis omitted) (“The idea that 
corporations are ‘persons’ with duties, liabilities, and rights has a long history in 
American domestic law. . . . It is an idea that continues to evolve in complex and 
unexpected ways.  See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 50 (2010).  
The history of corporate rights and obligations under domestic law is, however, entirely 
irrelevant to the issue before us—namely, the treatment of corporations as a matter of 
customary international law.” (internal citations omitted)). 
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are treated a particular way under international law, but rather simply how 
they are in fact treated.120  Nevertheless, it may again be difficult to separate 
a conclusion about the scope of the statute from preconceived notions about 
what corporations are.  For example, the Brief Amicus Curiae for the 
Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law in Support of Petitioners121 
notes the following: 
In his opinion denying rehearing, a distinguished member of the panel 
majority below asserted that requiring multinational corporations to 
defend against customary international law claims in United States courts 
would subject them to “extort[ed]” settlements, and unjustifiably 
“beggar” them. . . . Such a canard is deeply troubling, not only because it 
is so clearly legislative in nature, but because it is premised on an 
indefensible assumption that corporations are freestanding entities less 
prone to great evil than the fallible human beings who constitute them.122 
These are only two examples.  However, given the prominent role of 
corporations in our modern society, it should not be too hard to convince 
anyone of the proposition that many other cases like these—raising the 
question of how we should best define corporations—will confront the 
Court with regularity.123 
In light of this, one may ask what impact the Court expressly adopting a 
theory of the corporation would have.  First, “bringing this debate to the 
surface would allow commentators and advocates to better hold judges 
accountable for their decisions by leaving the judges less ‘wiggle room’ once 
they have expressly aligned themselves with a particular theory, even if the 
 
120 The question presented may ultimately extend even further beyond corporate theory.  See 
Lyle Denniston, Kiobel to be expanded and reargued, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 5, 2012, 2:01 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/03/kiobel-to-be-reargued/ (noting that the Supreme 
Court “ordered lawyers to come back with an expanded argument on the scope of a 1789 
law giving aliens a right to sue in U.S. courts. . . . [S]ome of the Justices . . . questioned 
whether the Alien Tort Statute allowed U.S. courts to hear lawsuits for violations of 
international law on foreign soil”). 
121 Brief Amicus Curiae for the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law in Support 
of Petitioners at 1, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. 
granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (Dec. 21, 2011) (No. 10-1491), 2011 WL 6813566. 
122 Id. at 1 (quoting Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 642 F.3d 268, 270–72 (2d Cir. 
2011) (opinion of Chief Judge Jacobs concurring in the denial of panel rehearing)). 
123 See Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation, supra note 6, at 235 (“A second timely debate that 
implicates corporate theory is proxy access.” (citing Larry Ribstein, The securities laws and 
the First Amendment, TRUTH ON THE MARKET (Dec. 28, 2010), http:// 
truthonthemarket.com/2010/12/28/the-securities-laws-and-the-first-amendment/ 
(suggesting that after Citizens United the Court will be less inclined to respect distinctions 
that up till now have been cited to support regulation of corporate speech in areas like 
shareholder proposals))); id. (citing Larry Ribstein, The SEC, global warming and the First 
Amendment, IDEOBLOG (Jan. 29, 2010, 6:35 AM), http://busmovie.typepad.com/
ideoblog/2010/01/the-sec-global-warming-and-the-first-amendment.html (making a 
similar argument in terms of Citizens United’s impact on the SEC’s ability to require 
corporate disclosures on climate change)). 
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debate is on-going.”124  Second, even where judges are able to avoid being 
held accountable in this way because “the application of legal theories is 
more fact specific, and therefore arguably more imprecise, than their 
adoption,”125 bringing the clash of corporate theories into the sunlight 
should nonetheless “serve to illuminate corporate law debates and rarefy the 
opposing parties.”126  A further potential benefit of having judges expressly 
adopt particular theories of the corporation in relevant cases is that it may 
clarify which party has the burden of proof.  For example, under the 
concession theory of the corporation, more of the burden would fall on 
those seeking to limit the state’s ability to regulate its creations.127  
Nonetheless, there are some valid criticisms of my proposal, and I discuss 
some of them next. 
V.  CRITICISMS OF CORPORATE THEORY’S RELEVANCE 
Some have suggested that the debate about the nature of the 
corporation has run its course.  Stephen Bainbridge has noted that, “the 
debate . . . is over . . . . Contractarians and noncontractarians no longer have 
much of interest to say to one another.”128  However, I would submit that all 
of the foregoing discussion highlighting the on-going silent corporate 
theory debate raging in the Supreme Court’s campaign finance cases 
suggests that contractarians and non-contractarians are still very much 
engaged.  Of course, Bainbridge may more properly be understood to be 
saying that all the relevant arguments on each side have been fleshed out.  
Thus, what is merely going on in these cases is fulfillment of the old saw that, 
while everything’s already been said, it has not yet been said by everyone.  
 
124 Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation, supra note 6, at 228. 
125 Id. 
126 Verret, supra note 25, at 315.  Cf. Roger Martin, Fixing the Game:  The Unintended 
Consequences of an Economic Theory, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 27, 2011, 2:40 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/roger-martin/fixing-the-game-the-unint_b_854481.html 
(“The only way we can avoid increasingly frequent stock market meltdowns—and all the 
pain, suffering and economic dislocation they cause—is to explore the theories that 
underpin American capitalism.”). 
127 Compare Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 925 (2010) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“Though faced with a constitutional text that makes no distinction between 
types of speakers, the dissent feels no necessity to provide even an isolated statement from 
the founding era to the effect that corporations are not covered, but places the burden on 
petitioners to bring forward statements showing that they are . . . .”), with id. at 950 n.55 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Given that corporations were 
conceived of as artificial entities and do not have the technical capacity to ‘speak,’ the 
burden of establishing that the Framers and ratifiers understood ‘the freedom of speech’ 
to encompass corporate speech is, I believe, far heavier than the majority 
acknowledges.”). 
128 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 31 (2002) (“[T]he debate 
has been fully played out.”). 
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Nonetheless, even here I would posit that new arguments continue to be 
made.  For example, I have argued elsewhere that the official arrival of the 
too-big-to-fail corporation, which arguably made its grand entrance as a part 
of the financial crisis of 2008, constituted a new “data point” in the 
corporate theory debate.129 
David Millon presents a further criticism when he argues that:  
“Historically, the political implications of the natural/artificial and 
entity/aggregate distinctions have been ambiguous, meaning different 
things at different times.”130  However, Millon is arguably best understood as 
warning us about the complexities of corporate theory’s “legitimatizing 
function,” as opposed to disputing that there is any such function at all.131  In 
other words, while it may not be possible to tie a particular corporate theory 
to a particular result in a particular case, corporate theory may nonetheless 
make a particular outcome more or less likely.  This view is consistent with 
the general alignment of “nexus-of-contracts theory with de-regulation, and 
concession theory with a fear of the negative consequences of de-
regulation.”132  It is also worth noting that Millon was responding to the 
 
129 Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation, supra note 6, at 209–12 (arguing that Dodd-Frank’s 
official recognition of the too-big-to-fail corporation undermined the majority’s opinion 
in Citizens United because that opinion rested on a theory of the corporation that espouses 
a worldview wherein deregulated markets lead to efficiency, not global crisis). 
130 Millon, supra note 33, at 202.  See also Avi-Yonah, supra note 39, at 1022–23. 
In 1926, John Dewey published an article in the Yale Law Journal in which he 
dismisses as irrelevant the debate among the aggregate, artificial entity, and real 
entity views of the corporation.  These views, he explains, could be deployed to 
suit any purpose; and he uses examples relying on the cyclical nature of these 
theories. His conclusion is that theory should be abandoned for an examination of 
reality. 
  Id. (footnotes omitted) (citing John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal 
Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655, 673 (1926)).  Cf. Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate 
Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629, 1631 (2011) (“[A] metaphor or philosophical 
conception of the corporation is not helpful for the type of functional analysis that the 
Court should conduct.  The Court should consider the purpose of the constitutional 
right at issue . . . .”).  But see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN 
LAW 1870–1960:  THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 106 (1992) (“[J]ohn Dewey . . . could 
not, I believe, have demonstrated successfully that each theory of corporate personality 
could have equally legitimated the practices of emergent large-scale business 
enterprise.”). 
131 See Millon, supra note 33, at 241 (“[P]articular theories of the corporation are perceived 
to justify particular legal rules or, at a more general level, a particular approach to 
regulation.  Although th[is] legitimation claim is a plausible interpretation . . . the 
connection between corporate theory and doctrinal and social developments is, in fact, a 
good deal more complex.  We have yet to develop an adequate account of corporate 
theory’s legitimating function.”). 
132 Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation, supra note 6, at 228.  See C. T. CARR, THE GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 165–73 (1905) (describing the concession 
theory of corporate powers as a response to fears about threats of corporate power to the 
sovereignty of the King); Joseph F. Morrissey, A Contractarian Defense of Corporate 
Regulation, 11 TRANSACTIONS:  TENN. J. BUS. L. 135, 138 (2009) (“The most problematic 
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arguments of the esteemed scholar Morton Horwitz, who described 
corporate theory as having “determinat[ive] normative implications” and 
playing a significant role in “the legitimation of legal doctrine and social 
practice.”133  As Horwitz put it: 
I wish to dispute [the] conclusion that particular conceptions of 
corporate personality were used just as easily to limit as to enhance 
corporate power.  I hope to show that, for example, the rise of a natural 
entity theory of the corporation was a major factor in legitimating big 
business and that none of the other theoretical alternatives could provide 
as much sustenance to newly organized, concentrated 
enterprise. . . . [W]hen abstract conceptions are used in specific 
historical contexts, they do acquire more limited meanings and more 
specific argumentative functions.134 
Ultimately, we need look no further than Citizens United itself for 
corporate theory’s relevancy. Citizens United’s conclusion that political 
speech restrictions may not be imposed on the basis of corporate status 
alone would simply not have been possible under concession theory, which 
essentially turns on the idea that corporations are different.  Rather, the 
result seemingly requires adoption of the contractarian view that 
corporations are merely associations of citizens—indistinguishable in any 
meaningful way from the bevy of other associations that dot the landscape.135 
Finally, it can be argued that even if corporate theory is less deterministic 
than I suggest herein, it nonetheless serves an important legitimization 
function.  That is to say, the average citizen hears the corporate theory story 
they are being told in these cases whether it is conveyed expressly or not.  
 
portion of the nexus-of-contracts framework for me has been the normative claim that 
many proponents of the framework have proffered:  that, because the corporation can be 
viewed as this bundle of privately ordered contracts, regulation is largely unnecessary and 
undesirable.” (footnote omitted)). 
133 Millon, supra note 33, at 204 (citing Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited:  The 
Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 221–22 (1985)). 
134 HORWITZ, supra note 130, at 68; see also DAVID A. WESTBROOK, BETWEEN CITIZEN AND 
STATE:  AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CORPORATION 135 (2007) (“[A]lthough theories [of 
the corporation] are not determinative, from time to time and in place to place, they 
tend to have certain specific associations.”). 
135 See Tucker, supra note 4, at 520 (arguing that flawed assumptions about “principles of 
corporate law or their ensuing realities” led the Court to mistakenly conclude that 
“corporate political speech is indistinguishable from individual political speech”); see also 
id. at 505–06 (“[T]ax treatment including the deduction of expenses and the levels of 
taxation (‘double’ for corporations), issues of criminal punishment, and the application 
of the commercial speech doctrine primarily to corporate speech are but a few examples 
of the unique treatment that corporations receive under the law.” (footnote omitted)); 
Blair, supra note 36, at 9 (“Despite the use of the phrase ‘corporate personhood’ as a 
summary expression to indicate that a firm has the full package of corporate 
characteristics, all four characteristics [immortality, entity persona, limited liability, and 
the separation of ownership and control] actually distinguish corporations from human 
persons.” (emphasis in original)). 
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Much of the public backlash against Citizens United can be seen as a populist 
rejection of the idea that corporations are merely associations of citizens.136  
As Thomas Joo has written in a related context: 
Although the shareholder-empowerment theory points out flaws in the 
status quo, it does not suggest that those flaws are fatal to the legitimacy 
of corporations or the corporate governance regime; indeed, it suggests 
that marginal reforms would be sufficient to make corporations fully 
legitimate in conformity with the orthodox fiduciary narrative.  By 
proposing this solution, it could be thought of as legitimating existing 
corporate institutions rather than challenging them.137 
Likewise, an honest and open debate about the role of corporate theory in 
cases like Citizens United could go a long way to “legitimating existing 
corporate institutions rather than challenging them” by better explaining 
the competing theories in the legal opinions that arguably turn on them.138  
Put another way, at least some of the distrust of corporations evident among 
citizens today might be alleviated by an open and thorough discussion of 
corporate theory. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have tried to show that corporate theory played an 
important role not only in the Supreme Court’s blockbuster Citizens United 
decision, but also in the significant line of campaign finance cases leading 
up to that decision.  This is an important point because there is no express 
discussion of corporate theory in these cases, and in fact Justice Stevens 
expressly disavows any role for corporate theory in his Citizens United dissent.  
This disconnect between what the Justices are saying and doing implicates 
the transparency, accountability, and legitimacy of the Court.  Rather than 
identify, explain, and defend their chosen theory of the corporation, the 
Justices ignore or deny any role for corporate theory at all.  In the face of the 
obvious rhetorical divide between those espousing various versions of 
contractarianism and concession theory, the opinions start to look like 
modern versions of Hans Christian Andersen’s “The Emperor’s New 
Clothes.”139  As Lino Graglia puts it: 
 
136 See generally Citizens United Backlash Grows from Cali. to NYC Urging Congress to Overturn 
Corporate Personhood, DEMOCRACY NOW (Jan. 5, 2012), http://www.democracynow.org/
2012/1/5/citizens_united_backlash_grows_from_cali (describing the response of state 
and local legislatures to the Citizens United decision). 
137 Thomas W. Joo, Narrative, Myth, and Morality in Corporate Legal Theory, 2009 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 1091, 1105 (2009). 
138 Id. 
139 HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSEN, The Emperor’s New Clothes, in FAIRY TALES 91 (Jackie 
Wullschlager ed., Tiina Nunnally trans., 2004). 
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The Emperor’s tailors were clever enough to convince him that they had 
made him a beautiful, though invisible, new suit of clothes.  Unable to 
believe, or unwilling to admit, that their Emperor had been fooled, his 
loyal subjects also admired the clothes until an innocent child, heedless 
of politics and propriety, pointed out that the Emperor was naked.  The 
Court is analogous to the Emperor’s tailors in regard to its rulings of 
unconstitutionality.  Although such rulings are obviously pure policy 
judgments, the Court wraps them in imaginary constitutional 
prohibitions, which professors of constitutional law, like the Emperor’s 
loyal subjects, then claim to see, in the confident expectation that few 
others will be bold or observant enough to point out that the alleged 
prohibitions are entirely imaginary.140 
Perhaps the public outcry in response to the Citizens United opinion will 
take on the role of the “innocent child” in the Hans Christian Andersen 
fable and help spur the Court to re-examine its avoidance and denial of the 
role of corporate theory in cases involving the rights and responsibilities of 
corporations under the Constitution.141 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
140 Lino A. Graglia, Originalism and the Constitution:  Does Originalism Always Provide the 
Answer?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 73, 75 (2011) (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 82 
(“It is only because of Justice Kennedy’s vote, that the First Amendment prohibits the 
federal government from limiting political speech by a corporation.” (citing Citizens 
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010))). 
141 Cf. Steven J. André, The Transformation of Freedom of Speech:  Unsnarling the Twisted Roots of 
Citizens United v. FEC, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 69, 106 n.228 (2010) (“The views of the 
Legal Realists notwithstanding, suffice it to say, the Court’s susceptibility to the influence 
of public opinion is by now well accepted.” (citing WILLIAM K. MUIR, JR., LAW AND 
ATTITUDE CHANGE (1984); Christopher J. Casillas, Peter K. Enns & Patrick C. Wohlfarth, 
How Public Opinion Constrains The Supreme Court (Nov. 5, 2008), available at 
http://government.arts.cornell.edu/assets/faculty/docs/enns/Opinion_SC.pdf (“We 
argue that the public mood establishes a boundary that constrains—and thus directly 
infuences—the Court’s behavior.”))). 
